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 Kokesh v. SEC:  The Demise of Disgorgement 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of serious securities violations leading to the stock 
market crash of 1929, Congress established a series of laws to ensure the 
“highest ethical standards prevail in every facet of the securities 
industry.”1  As part of this reform, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the “Exchange Act”) created the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the “SEC”), granting it broad authority to enforce federal securities laws 
and adopt rules to protect investors and promote the public interest.2  The 
Exchange Act also vested the SEC with the power to investigate possible 
federal securities violations and initiate federal judicial proceedings 
against wrongdoers.3  Under the original language of the Exchange Act, 
the SEC was permitted to pursue only injunctive relief against these 
defendants in civil enforcement actions barring future violations.4   
Despite the fact that Congress had not explicitly authorized it to 
do so, the SEC began seeking judicial enforcement of remedies outside 
of injunctive relief in the late 1960s.5  In 1970, the SEC succeeded in 
convincing a federal district court to permit the remedy of disgorgement 
under the premise that the SEC had the “inherent equity power to grant 
 
 1. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1639–1640 (2017) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–187 (1963)). 
 2. See id. at 1640 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 
(1975)); see also William B. Snyder, Jr., The Securities Act of 1933 After SLUSA: Federal 
Class Actions Belong in Federal Court, 85 N.C. L. REV. 669, 673 (2007) (stating that the 
Exchange Act provided for a “broader regulation of securities markets.”). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(b), 78u(c); see also SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 
741 (1984) (stating that Congress vested the SEC with broad authority to investigate securities 
violations). 
 4. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:37 (7th ed., rev. 2016) 
(stating that the Commission was given the authority to seek injunctive relief for securities 
violations in both administrative and federal courts); see also ANTONIA M. APPS ET AL., 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONCLUDES SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY” SUBJECT 
TO FIVE-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIOD (June 12, 2017) [hereinafter SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A 
“PENALTY”] https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/b81ac0ae-ba89-4700-a3fc-
5a25a5d8a355.pdf (stating that the only remedy initially available to the SEC in 1934 was 
injunctive relief). 
 5. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4. 
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relief ancillary to an injunction.”6  Relying on case law interpreting the 
Exchange Act, the United States District Court for Southern District of 
New York in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ruled that the SEC could 
seek equitable remedies instead of injunctive relief, “so long as such relief 
[was] remedial relief.”7  The court ordered Texas Gulf Sulphur to pay 
restitution, disgorging the profits they had obtained from their illegal 
activity.8  According to the court, these measures were to “deprive . . . 
[Texas Gulf Sulphur] of their profits in order to remove any monetary 
reward for violating” securities laws and to “protect the investing public 
by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.”9  
In 1990, Congress amended the Exchange Act by adopting the 
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (the 
“1990 Remedies Act”), authorizing the SEC to pursue civil monetary 
penalties.10  The 1990 Remedies Act also explicitly affirmed that the SEC 
had the power “to order disgorgement of illegal profits in administrative 
proceedings against regulated entities.”11  While this gave the SEC the 
express authority to seek disgorgement in administrative actions, 
Congress was silent as to the SEC’s authority to pursue disgorgement 
awards in federal court proceedings.12   
 
 6. Disgorgement is “[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) 
on demand or by legal compulsion.” Disgorgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014); See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 91 (S.D.N.Y 1970); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) 
(permitting the remedy and referencing “disgorgement” as a form of “restitution measured by 
the defendant’s wrongful gain.”). 
 7. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. at 91 (ruling that equitable relief sought by 
the SEC must be “remedial” in nature). 
 8. See id. (ordering the disgorgement of profits); see also Russell G. Ryan, The Equity 
Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3 (Nov. 15, 2013), http://
www.hblr.org/2013/11/the-equity-facade-of-sec-disgorgement/#_ftn13 (stating that Texas 
Gulf Sulphur was the first case in which the SEC pursued and obtained disgorgement, which 
was referred to by some earlier courts as “restitution.”). 
 9. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. at 91 (stating the purposes of disgorgement 
and equitable relief available to the SEC). 
 10. See, e.g., Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act §§ 101, 
202, 20(d), 21B, 104, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u-2 (1990) (permitting “the SEC to seek, and courts 
to impose, among other things, monetary penalties, officer-director bars, and penny-stock bars 
against any violator and authorizing the SEC to impose monetary penalties and other sanctions 
administratively against persons and entities in SEC-regulated industries.”). 
 11. Comm’r Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, The SEC’s New Powers 
Under the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Remarks 
at the Association of General Counsel (Oct. 4, 1990) (transcript available at SEC.gov). 
 12. Dixie L. Johnson et al., King & Spalding Discusses Potential Effects of SEC 
Disgorgement As a Penalty, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 21, 2017) [hereinafter King & 
Spalding], http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/06/21/king-spalding-discusses-
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The Exchange Act was further amended in 2002 through the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, providing that in an SEC civil enforcement action, 
“the Commission may seek, and any federal court may grant, any 
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of 
investors.”13  Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act still did not address 
whether the SEC had the explicit power to seek disgorgement, the 
widespread assumption remained that disgorgement could be pursued as 
an equitable remedy.14  Through this line of reasoning, the government 
continued to seek disgorgement, citing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as 
statutory authority for ordering the remedy.15   
However, in June 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided SEC v. Kokesh, relabeling disgorgement as a “penalty.” 16  As a 
result, disgorgement is now subject to the five-year statute of limitations 
found in 28 U.S.C § 2462 (“Statute of Limitations”) applying to all civil 
monetary penalties.17  The ruling in Kokesh has serious consequences for 
SEC investigations as well as for the future of disgorgement as a remedy 
at law.18  Kokesh not only severely limits the government’s ability to 
pursue disgorgement payments in the event of civil violations, but also 
calls into question whether the practice of disgorgement is permissible at 
all.19   
 
potential-effects-of-sec-disgorgement-as-penalty/ (discussing the lack of express statutory 
authority regarding the SEC’s authority to pursue disgorgement in federal court). 
 13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2002). 
 14. See U.S. S.E.C. v. Quan, 817 F.3d 583, 595 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that disgorgement 
is an equitable remedy authorized by 78u(d)(5)); see also SEC v. World Capital Market, Inc., 
864 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that federal courts may grant equitable relief 
“necessary to the benefit of investors,” including disgorgement). 
 15. Ryan, supra note 8 (noting that despite the lack of apparent authority, the SEC 
continued to seek disgorgement as an equitable remedy under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 16. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1645 (2017) (ruling that disgorgement is a 
penalty within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2462). 
 17. While other remedies are not subject to a statutory period, “penalties” are limited by 
the five-year statutory limitation provision listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. See JACULIN AARON, 
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HOLDS SEC DISGORGEMENT 
ORDERS SUBJECT TO FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (June 12, 2017), http://
www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/publications/2017/06/us-sc-sec-subject-to-five-yr-
statute-limitations (indicating that penalties, not equitable remedies, are subject to the five-
year statutory period). 
 18. See SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4 (describing several 
implications resulting from the Kokesh ruling). 
 19. See SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4, at 1 (stating that the Kokesh 
ruling may not only limit the SEC’s ability to pursue disgorgement payments, but also calls 
into question the legality of the remedy). 
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From Texas Gulf Sulphur through Kokesh, the SEC routinely 
pursued disgorgement as a standard remedy in civil enforcement cases.20  
During this time, the boundaries of disgorgement were tested and 
expanded.21  With the general language provided by Congress and the 
broad authority granted by courts, the SEC was able to pursue 
disgorgement as an equitable remedy with successful results.22 
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II provides a synopsis of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kokesh v. SEC.23  Part III explains the 
implications of Kokesh upon SEC enforcement strategies and resulting 
monetary judgments.24  Part IV discusses the future of disgorgement and 
the potential challenges it will face in the future.25  Finally, Part V 
provides a conclusion of the consequences resulting from the ruling in 
Kokesh.26 
II. KOKESH V. SEC  
On June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
Kokesh v. SEC, altering how disgorgement claims are defined.27  In 
Kokesh, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Charles 
Kokesh, the owner of two investment-adviser firms that provided 
investment guidance to business-development companies.28  The 
government alleged that, from 1995 to 2009, Kokesh had 
misappropriated funds from four business-development companies.29  
The SEC also alleged that Kokesh had concealed the misappropriation of 
 
 20. See Ryan, supra note 8 (“[T]he SEC has been seeking disgorgement for decades, and 
courts have been granting it for nearly as long.”). 
 21. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (describing the “aggressive” expansion of the 
boundaries of disgorgement past a defendant’s personal ill-gotten gains); see also SEC v. 
Banner Fund Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 617 (D.C Cir. 2000) (rejecting the defendant’s argument 
that disgorgement was limited to personal ill-gotten gains and asserting that the defendant’s 
approach would incentivize violators to “spend or transfer tainted profits”); SEC v. 
Whittemore, 691 F. Supp. 2d 198, 207 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that it was “not germane” 
whether a defendant continued to possess the illicit funds). 
 22. See Ryan, supra note 8 (stating that disgorgement actions were routinely pursued and 
granted regularly in federal court). 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
 27. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1645 (2017) (ruling that disgorgement would 
now be considered a “penalty” rather than an “equitable remedy” at law). 
 28. Id. at 1641. 
 29. Id. 
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these illicit gains by filing false and misleading SEC reports and proxy 
statements.30  The SEC sought monetary penalties, injunctive relief, and 
disgorgement from Kokesh.31  The district court determined that the five-
year Statute of Limitations barred the claim for monetary penalties, but 
not the claim for disgorgement because it was not a “penalty” to which 
the Statute of Limitations applied.32  Since charges had been brought 
against Kokesh in 2009, the government was precluded from pursuing 
penalties based on the defendant’s actions prior to 2004, limiting the civil 
monetary penalty to approximately $2.35 million.33  However, because 
the court ruled that disgorgement was not restricted by the five-year 
statutory period, Kokesh was found liable and ordered to pay the full 
$34.9 million disgorgement payment, $29.9 million of which resulted 
from illegal acts committed outside the statutory period.34 
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Kokesh argued that the Statute of 
Limitations applied to disgorgement, stating that the disgorgement 
payment was equivalent to either a penalty or forfeiture.35  The Tenth 
Circuit determined that disgorgement was not a “penalty” within the 
meaning of the Statute of Limitations.36  The Tenth Circuit distinguished 
the meaning of disgorgement from that of forfeiture, holding that 
disgorgement was a non-punitive remedy, unlike civil asset forfeiture.37  
This ruling contrasted with the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in SEC v. 
Graham, holding that “disgorgement” and “forfeiture” were so similar in 
nature that the Statute of Limitations applied to both remedies.38 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kokesh in order to 
resolve the circuit split over the application of the Statute of Limitations 
to disgorgement claims in SEC enforcement actions.39  Upon review, the 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1641 (2017). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2016) (describing Kokesh’s 
argument against the SEC’s pursuit of the disgorgement claim on appeal). 
 36. Id. at 1164 (reversing the lower court ruling and stating that disgorgement, when 
“[p]roperly applied . . . does not inflict punishment.”). 
 37. See id. at 1166 (describing the rationale in determining that disgorgement was not a 
penalty, unlike asset forfeiture). 
 38. SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2016) (equating the penalty of 
“forfeiture” to “disgorgement”). 
 39. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1641 (2017) (describing the reasoning for 
granting certiorari to hear Kokesh’s case). 
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Supreme Court held that civil disgorgement is a penalty similar to civil 
asset forfeiture, and therefore subject to the five-year Statute of 
Limitations.40  According to the Court, whether a statute is considered a 
penalty is determined by two points of inquiry.41  The first considers 
whether the statute seeks to ameliorate a wrong to the public or a wrong 
to an individual.42  The second looks at whether the payment sought is for 
the purpose of punishment or deterrence, or to compensate an injured 
party.43  
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court in Kokesh found 
that “SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 2462.”44  First, the Supreme Court determined that SEC 
enforcement actions seeking disgorgement were meant to remedy public 
wrongs rather than compensate individual victims.45  Second, the Court 
decided that “SEC disgorgement is imposed for punitive purposes,” on 
the basis that sanctions created for the purpose of deterrence “are 
inherently punitive because deterrence is not a legitimate non-punitive 
governmental objective.”46  The court also relied on the fact that 
disgorgement often left defendants in worse position due to the fact that 
judgments were ordered without considering expenses, which often 
reduce the illegal profits.47  Consequently, because “disgorgement orders 
go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants 
wrongdoers as a consequence of violating public laws, they represent a 
penalty and thus fall within [the Statute of Limitations].”48 
 
 40. Id. at 1645. 
 41. Id. at 1642. 
 42. See id. (“First, whether a sanction represents a penalty turns in part on ‘whether the 
wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.’”) (citing 
Huntington v. Attril, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892)). 
 43. See id. (“Second, a pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty if it is sought ‘for the 
purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner’ rather than to 
compensate victims.”) (citing Huntington v. Attril, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892)). 
 44. Id. at 1643. 
 45. See id. (considering the first inquiry: whether the statute seeks to ameliorate a wrong 
to the public). 
 46. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017) (considering the second line of inquiry: 
whether the statute seeks punish or deter versus compensate injured parties). 
 47. See id. (ruling that because disgorgement often left defendants “worse off,” it went 
beyond the sole purpose of unjust enrichment). 
 48. Id. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF KOKESH  
A. On SEC Strategies 
Since Kokesh, many have contemplated the potential implications 
the ruling will have upon the SEC’s pursuit of civil enforcement actions.49  
Some contend that the new application of the Statute of Limitations will 
have little to no effect on most SEC enforcement actions due to the fact 
that “the Commission typically acts, or preserves claims, within five 
years of the misconduct.”50  However, it is more likely that the ruling in 
Kokesh will have a significant impact on the SEC’s ability to pursue 
disgorgement payments, the strategies it uses to investigate such 
enforcement actions, and the resulting settlements and judgments for 
cases involving disgorgement.51 
The application of the Statute of Limitations to disgorgement 
cases sets up potential problems for the SEC in the pursuit of these 
claims.52  Before Kokesh, the SEC could methodically evaluate all 
options in investigating its case, knowing that disgorgement would still 
be available as an equitable remedy.53  However, the SEC will face new 
 
 49. King & Spalding, supra note 12. 
 50. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (stating that the ruling in Kokesh will have only 
a minor effect upon the SEC in investigating enforcement actions due to the fact that it often 
pursues claims within the five-year statutory period); see also Antoinette Gartrell, Justices’ 
Ruling Will Limit SEC Settlement Clout, Lawyers Say, BLOOMBERG, (June 6, 2017), https://
www.bna.com/justices-ruling-limit-n73014451932/ (quoting lawyer, Jonathan A. Shapiro of 
Baker Botts LLP, that the decision will have “zero impact” on the SEC and its ability to bring 
cases long term). 
 51. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (describing the potential effects of the Kokesh 
ruling upon SEC investigative strategies); see also IRIS E. BENNETT ET AL., SMITH PACHTER 
MCWHORTER PLC, SUPREME COURT LIMITS POWERFUL SEC ENFORCEMENT TOOL, HOLDING 
THAT DISGORGEMENT IS SUBJECT TO FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (June 7, 2017), 
http://www.smithpachter.com/post-detail.php?id=30217 (describing the effects of the Kokesh 
ruling upon settlements); Gartrell, supra note 50 (indicating that the ruling may affect 
settlement negotiations by reducing government leverage); MAXIMILIEN FETAZ ET AL., 
BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP, KOKESH MAY LEAD TO LOWER MONETARY 
SANCTIONS IN SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS (June 21, 2017), https://www.bhfs.com/
insights/alerts-articles/2017/kokesh-may-lead-to-lower-monetary-sanctions-in-sec-
enforcement-proceedings (describing the effect of the Kokesh ruling upon monetary 
judgments). 
 52. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (describing potential roadblocks that the SEC 
may encounter in pursuing disgorgement claims against those committing securities 
violations). 
 53. Jeff Kern et al., Supreme Court Deals Blow to SEC By Applying Five-Year Statute of 
Limitations to Disgorgement Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, SHEPPARD, MULLIN, 
RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP: GOV’T CONTRACTS & INVESTIGATIONS BLOG (June 28, 2017), 
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and difficult challenges with the Statute of Limitations now applying to 
disgorgement claims.54  These issues become especially relevant in cases 
involving violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), long 
running schemes, accounting fraud, or investigations requiring the 
government to gather information from foreign regulators.55  In these 
cases, it may take longer than the five-year Statute of Limitations period 
to gather the necessary information to mount a claim against 
defendants.56  
As a result of the ruling in Kokesh, the SEC will become more 
aggressive in its tactics involving the investigation of civil enforcement 
actions in order to bring charges more quickly.57  First, the SEC might 
add more weight to “self-reporting,” a factor which it considers favorably 
in determining what charges should be levied against defendants.58  The 
SEC has formally honored self-reporting since the adoption of its 
cooperation program in 2010, identifying it as one of several factors to be 
 
https://www.governmentcontractslawblog.com/2017/06/articles/securities-exchange-
commission-sec/sec-disgorgement-remedies/ (describing the prior timeline which the SEC 
was able to work with involving disgorgement claims). 
 54. King & Spalding, supra note 12 (describing the impact which the Kokesh decision 
may have upon the SEC’s pursuit of disgorgement claims); see also Gartrell, supra note 50 
(discussing the way that SEC examinations and settlements will be reshaped due to the newly 
imposed limitation period). 
 55. King & Spalding, supra note 12 (indicating the types of cases where the new time 
limitation might be especially relevant); SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4 
(stating that the SEC may now encounter difficulty in pursuing disgorgement in cases 
involving long-running frauds and FCPA claims). 
 56. King & Spalding, supra note 12 (indicating that these particular types of cases involve 
long-term investigations, which may run past the five-year tolling period). 
 57. King & Spalding, supra note 12 (describing the change in speed which the SEC may 
now work to move in long-running investigations). 
 58. See LORRAINE B. ECHAVARRIA, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, 
WHEN THE INEVITABLE HAPPENS: WHEN TO SELF-REPORT SECURITIES LAW VIOLATIONS AND 
WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU DO (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.wilmerhale.com/
uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2017-09-27-When-the-
Inevitable-Happens-When-to-Self-Report-Securities-Law-Violations-and-What-to-Expect-
When-You-Do(1).pdf  (“[I]n some cases, there is flexibility as to how to calculate 
disgorgement, and the Enforcement Staff might take a narrower view of what should be 
disgorgement in recognition of cooperation.”); see also King & Spalding, supra note 12 
(describing the effect that the Kokesh decision may have upon the SEC’s factor of “self-
reporting” in enforcement investigations); JUNAID A. ZUBAIRI ET AL., VEDDER PRICE, IS 
COOPERATION CREDIT WORTHWHILE? CONSIDERATIONS IN SELF-REPORTING TO THE SEC 
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.vedderprice.com/is-cooperation-credit-worthwhile-
considerations-in-self-reporting-to-the-sec (“The SEC offers real benefits—such as reduced 
charges or penalties, deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements—to 
those who self-report and cooperate . . . The SEC will measure a company’s cooperation 
efforts at the end of an investigation . . . .”). 
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considered in determining the appropriate charges and remedies sought 
in enforcement actions.59  In an effort to speed up investigations, the SEC 
may increase the weight given to self-reporting, incentivizing companies 
to provide the government with more information earlier in the 
investigative process.60  This decision would add a layer of complexity to 
the already difficult balancing test companies consider when weighing 
the advantages and disadvantages of self-reporting.61 
Second, the SEC may focus its efforts on expediting the 
production of information.62  In 2015, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
submitted a recommendation to the SEC indicating that promoting 
expediency during document production is a vital step in “improv[ing] 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the SEC investigation process.”63  In 
following this advice, the Commission will likely reach out to companies 
earlier to request information and begin a dialogue concerning the scope 
of production.64  The SEC will also be hesitant to grant time extensions 
for document production and rescheduling testimony, as both present 
significant delays for investigations.65  Overall, it is likely that there will 
 
 59. See ZUBAIRI ET AL., supra note 58, at 2 (stating that the SEC has indicated “self-
policing, self-reporting, remediation, and cooperation” as the key factors to be considered 
when determining which charges and remedies to seek against defendants). 
 60. King & Spalding, supra note 12 (indicating that the SEC may add more weight to the 
factor of self-reporting as a means to increase efficiency during investigations). 
 61. See KARA NOVACO BROCKMEYER ET AL., DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, U.S. SUPREME 
COURT’S RULING ON DISGORGEMENT HAS BROAD IMPLICATIONS FOR FCPA MATTERS 5 (June 
2017), https://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2017/06/fcpa_upda 
te_june_2017a.pdf (discussing how companies may balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of self-reporting SEC violations to the government); see also KURT WOLFE, 
ALLEN & OVERY LLP, KOKESH IS A GAME CHANGER FOR THE SEC’S FCPA ENFORCEMENT 
PROGRAM (June 29, 2017), http://www.aoinvestigationsinsight.com/kokesh-is-a-game-
changer-for-the-secs-fcpa-enforcement-program/ (discussing how companies may decide not 
to self-report at all should all the conduct fall outside the Statute of Limitations); Thomas R. 
Fox, The Kokesh Decision - One Question Answered, Others Left Open, FCPA COMPLIANCE 
& ETHICS BLOG (June 7, 2017), http://fcpacompliancereport.com/2017/06/12782/. 
 62. King & Spalding, supra note 12 (describing the impact which the Kokesh ruling may 
have upon other aspects of SEC investigations). 
 63. CENTER FOR CAPITAL MKT. COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND 
PRACTICES 6 (July 2015), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015 
/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1.pdf. 
 64. See id. at 7 (stating that increasing efficiency during document production can 
increase the effectiveness and speed of investigations). 
 65. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (discussing the SEC’s potential hesitancy to 
postpone testimony or delay document production in post-Kokesh investigations). 
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be renewed efforts by the SEC to streamline the procedures it follows 
during enforcement investigations.66  
Third, the SEC is also likely to change its strategy on how it 
pursues tolling agreements with targeted companies and individuals.67  A 
tolling agreement is “an agreement between a potential plaintiff and 
potential defendant by which the defendant agrees to extend the statutory 
limitations period on the plaintiff’s claim . . . so that both parties will have 
more time to solve their dispute without litigation.”68  Many defendants 
choose to enter into these agreements with the government to avoid the 
risk and publicity of a lawsuit.69  While the SEC currently uses tolling 
agreements during investigations, the government may now pursue these 
agreements earlier and more frequently than in past years for those 
investigations expected to continue for a significant amount of time.70  
However, responding to the ruling in Kokesh, there may be a shift in 
defendants’ willingness to enter into tolling agreements with the SEC.71  
Since disgorgement payments often account for a greater portion of the 
monetary settlement than civil penalties, defendants will likely reconsider 
 
 66. See LEVI MCALLISTER & PAMELA TSANG WU, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, US 
SUPREME COURT IMPOSES LIMITATIONS ON DISGORGEMENT (June 16, 2017), https://
www.morganlewis.com/blogs/ferc/2017/06/us-supreme-court-imposes-limitations-on-
disgorgement (describing renewed efforts to streamline SEC enforcement investigations); see 
ANDREW M. LAWRENCE ET AL., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, SUPREME 
COURT APPLIES STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO SEC DISGORGEMENT ORDERS (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2017/06/supreme-court-applies-statute-of-
limitations (stating that SEC may recommit to previous efforts to streamline internal 
procedures to expedite investigations). 
 67. MAURO M. WOLFE ET AL., DUANE MORRIS LLP, TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR THE SEC: 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON LIMITING SEC DISGORGEMENT TO A FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF 




 68. Tolling Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 69. See Dina ElBoghdady, Clock Ticking for SEC to Pursue Fraud Charges in Financial 
Crisis Cases, WASH. POST (July 19, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/clock-ticking-for-sec-to-pursue-fraud-charges-in-financial-crisis-cases/2012/07/
19/gJQAZvjlwW_story.html?utm_term=.5bd24861b802 (stating that defendants prefer to 
enter into these agreements to “avoid a dramatic event such as a lawsuit”). 
 70. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (describing the increase in frequency and earlier 
timeline for pursuing tolling agreements); see also, LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 66 
(discussing the implications of Kokesh related to the SEC seeking tolling agreements during 
investigations). 
 71. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 66 (predicting pushback from clients concerning 
their willingness to enter into tolling agreements with the SEC). 
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signing these agreements.72  With the newly imposed time limitation on 
disgorgement claims, some defense attorneys may advise clients to play 
hardball with investigators, forcing the SEC to either file charges based 
on potentially “poorly investigated matters” or walk away from the case 
altogether.73  However, to avoid the “wide-ranging, time-sensitive 
demands for documents, information, and witness testimony,” it is likely 
that defendants will continue to enter into tolling agreements, but firmly 
negotiate the terms of the contract to apply to only the conduct at issue.74 
Finally, there may be an increase in the number of criminal 
referrals to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in matters involving long-
running illegal activity.75  In cases where the SEC may not be able to 
reach back to capture all “ill-gotten gains” from a defendant’s illegal 
activity, it may choose to pass the case to the DOJ to pursue criminal 
forfeiture proceedings.76  Unlike civil forfeiture and other penalties 
sought by the SEC, criminal forfeiture proceedings are not subject to a 
statutory period.77  Although the government must meet a higher burden 
of proof to succeed in these criminal claims, the absence of the limitations 
period may incentivize the SEC to forward more cases to the DOJ as a 
way to capture all profits obtained from a defendant’s illegal conduct.78  
 
 72. See MARY P. HANSEN ET AL., DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, SUPREME COURT 
UNANIMOUSLY CURBS SEC’S POWER TO OBTAIN DISGORGEMENT (June 8, 2017), https://
www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/2017/06/the-supreme-court-curbs-secs-power 
(stating that counsel to defendants may advise defendants to carefully consider whether to 
agree to requests for tolling agreements). 
 73. See WOLFE ET AL., supra note 67 (discussing the decrease in leverage that the SEC 
might expect during negotiations involving tolling agreements after the Kokesh ruling). 
 74. See WOLFE ET AL., supra note 67 (stating that companies should negotiate tolling 
agreements to limit the scope to only the conduct at issue); see ECHAVARRIA, supra note 58 
(indicating that disgorgement amounts may now be on the table for negotiations because it is 
considered a civil monetary penalty). 
 75. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4. 
 76. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4 (discussing the potential increase 
in criminal referrals to the DOJ of cases involving long-running illegal activity). 
 77. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4 (stating that the relaxed criminal 
standard in pursuing forfeiture may be an incentive for the SEC to refer enforcement cases to 
the DOJ). 
 78. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS A “PENALTY,” supra note 4  (indicating why criminal 
forfeiture may be a more effective remedy in cases involving illegal conduct occurring over 
a long period of time). 
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B. On Monetary Settlements  
The ruling in Kokesh may also have a significant impact upon the 
civil monetary settlements resulting from SEC enforcement actions 
involving disgorgement.79  Specifically, negotiations may be affected by 
the Kokesh decision, which has removed the “specter of litigation” of the 
past that had left defendants vulnerable to monetary exposure well past 
five years.80  With the SEC’s power now restricted by the Statute of 
Limitations, the agency will encounter reduced leverage in SEC 
settlement negotiations.81  Prior to Kokesh, defendants with disgorgement 
liability extending well over five years might have felt a strong incentive 
to settle on the government’s terms, knowing that the SEC could pursue 
the illicit funds as far back as the illegal activity occurred.82  With the 
Kokesh decision limiting the government’s ability to pursue 
disgorgement, defendants in similar situations may now choose to 
negotiate with the SEC for a lower settlement figure.83  These settlements 
may also be reached in a shorter amount of time since there may now be 
more certainty as to the amount of disgorgement the SEC will be 
permitted to seek in judicial proceedings.84 
C. On Other Remedies 
The Kokesh ruling may also have an impact on the types of 
remedies pursued by the SEC.85  By statute, the SEC has the authority to 
 
 79. Mary Jo White et al., What Kokesh v. SEC Means For Enforcement Actions, LAW360 
(June 8, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/932661/what-kokesh-v-sec-
means-for-enforcement-actions. 
 80. See Mary Jo White et al., supra note 79 (explaining how disgorgement negotiations 
may be affected by the ruling in Kokesh, which set the Statute of Limitations upon 
disgorgement actions). 
 81. See Mary Jo White et al., supra note 79 (discussing the reduction in leverage for the 
SEC during negotiations involving disgorgement). 
 82. See Mary Jo White et al., supra note 79 (indicating that, before Kokesh, the SEC 
enjoyed a greater amount of negotiating ability due to its unhindered ability to pursue 
disgorgement). 
 83. WOLFE, supra note 67 (discussing the shift in the bargaining paradigm after Kokesh 
and how defendants may have increased power to negotiate settlements in SEC enforcement 
actions). 
 84. See Gartrell, supra note 50 (“New York Lawyer Jack Yoskowitz [of Seward & Kissel 
LLP] . . . said, some cases could settle faster because there may now be certainty as to the 
amount in disgorgement the SEC can seek in court.”). 
 85. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 66 (stating that the ruling in Kokesh may push the 
SEC to pursue other remedies which are not subject to the Statute of Limitations). 
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pursue other remedies for securities violations beyond penalties or 
disgorgement.86  Post-Kokesh, there may be a rise in equitable remedies 
that are sought which are not affected by the Statute of Limitations, such 
as injunctive relief or professional bars.87  Additionally, the SEC might 
attempt to seek restitution for claimants in cases “where the objective is 
more clearly remedial and not a sanction by the government.”88   
However, some believe that the ruling in Kokesh may have 
“cascad[ing] effects” upon equitable sanctions as well, calling into 
question the remedial nature of injunctions and bars against serving as 
officers or directors of an organization.89  The Fifth Circuit last grappled 
with this issue in S.E.C. v. Bartek, when the government sought injunctive 
relief and professional bars against defendants based on illegal activity 
occurring prior to the five-year Statute of Limitations.90  While the SEC 
argued that the remedies were equitable in nature, the Fifth Circuit 
disagreed.91  The Fifth Circuit ruled that the two forms of relief were 
punitive, rejecting the notion that “penalties” referred solely to sanctions 
affecting a defendant’s monetary or property interests.92  In reaching this 
decision, the court applied an objective analysis, looking to the nature of 
the remedies sought.93  Because the two remedies: (1) would have a 
“stigmatizing effect and long-lasting repercussions;” (2) did not remedy 
the past harm caused by the defendants; (3) would not prevent future 
harm “in light of minimal likelihood of similar conduct in the future;” 
and (4) were “disproportionately severe compared to similar cases,” they 
 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2016) (“In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by 
the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and 
any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the 
benefit of investors.”). 
 87. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 66 (stating that the SEC may pursue equitable 
remedies which are not time-barred by the Statute of Limitations for illegal activity occurring 
prior to the five-year mark). 
 88. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 66 (stating that restitution might be permissible 
where the profits are returned directly to the injured party). This would remove the 
“characteristics that the Court viewed as penal in the disgorgement context,” making it more 
likely that the court would see these remedies as equitable rather than punitive. 
 89. White et al., supra note 79 (stating that there may be “cascaded effects” onto other 
types of remedies available to the SEC); S.E.C. v. Bartek, No. 11-10594, 2012 WL 3205446, 
at *957 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2012) (addressing whether injunctive relief barring future violations 
and professional bars were “penalties” under the language of the statute). 
 90. Bartek, No. 11-10594, 2012 WL 3205446, at *950. 
 91. Id. at *956. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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were considered penalties.94  For this reason, the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
the remedies were time-barred by the Statute of Limitations.95  
The decision in Bartek sheds light on the judiciary’s ability to set 
boundaries for the government in its pursuit of both equitable remedies 
and civil monetary penalties.96  While few courts have labeled claims for 
injunctive relief and professional bars as penalties,97 the reasoning in 
Bartek, coupled with the Kokesh ruling, sets the foundation for future 
challenges to the two sanctions.98  Nevertheless, there remains no clear 
answer as to whether all historically equitable remedies are potentially 
vulnerable to the Statute of Limitations.99  Since Bartek, the Eleventh 
Circuit has split with the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that injunctive 
relief was not a penalty, but rather an “equitable, forward-looking 
remed[y].”100  Thus, it remains to be seen how courts will come out on 
this issue and whether the SEC will face further constraints in enforcing 
claims in civil enforcement actions.101  However, should there be a 
decision to extend Bartek’s rationale to injunctive relief, professional 
bars, and other forms of seemingly equitable relief, the appeal of pursuing 
these remedies in place of disgorgement would likely be substantially 
reduced for the SEC.102  
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bartek, No. 11-10594, 2012 WL 3205446, at *957 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2012). 
 96. See id. at *956 (ruling that the injunction and officer-and-director bars were penalties 
at law and subject to the Statute of Limitations). 
 97. See id. at *957 (5th Cir. August 7 2012) (holding that the injunction and professional 
bars were “penalties” subject to the Statute of Limitations); see also SEC v. Jones, 476 F. 
Supp. 2d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (ruling that because the SEC had not established that there was 
a reasonable likelihood that the permanent injunction would prevent future harm, the remedy 
was sought as a “penalty” and time-barred by the Statute of Limitations). 
 98. See White et al., supra note 79 (stating that defendants may now find success in 
arguing that seemingly equitable remedies are “penalties,” based on the language of Kokesh). 
 99. See White et al., supra note 79 (indicating that the decisions in Kokesh and past cases 
may call into question whether equitable remedies are subject to the Statute of Limitations); 
but see SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Our precedent forecloses the 
argument that § 2462 applies to injunctions, which are equitable remedies.”). 
 100. Graham, 823 F.3d at 1363. 
 101. See Thomas O. Gorman, SEC Injunction Not Time Barred – In This Case, SEC 
ACTIONS (July 5, 2017), http://www.secactions.com/sec-injunction-not-time-barred-in-this-
case/ (noting that the Circuit Courts are split over whether an injunction is considered a 
penalty under the Statute of Limitations). 
 102. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 66 (explaining that the increased pursuance of other 
equitable remedies would be for the purpose of evading the Statute of Limitations period). 
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D. On Administrative Proceedings 
Kokesh not only poses problems for the SEC in federal court, but 
in administrative courts as well.103  As the ruling in Kokesh applies 
generally to “SEC disgorgement,” and the Statute of Limitations is not 
limited to use in federal court, it is very likely that the five-year time 
limitation will apply to administrative actions.104  Moreover, treating the 
remedy differently in an administrative court would leave an “odd 
situation,” where the government can pick and choose its remedy based 
upon which court it decides to bring the claim in.105  In sum, there is little 
doubt that courts will apply the Statute of Limitations equally in both 
federal and administrative proceedings.106  
IV. THE FUTURE OF DISGORGEMENT 
A. Redefining the Scope of Disgorgement 
Other recent decisions indicate a trend in the court system 
towards limiting the scope of disgorgement as well as other civil 
monetary penalties.107  In 2017, in Honeycutt v. United States, the court 
addressed the issue of whether a defendant may be held jointly and 
severally liable under criminal forfeiture law, even if the individual never 
received the ill-gotten gains.108  In Honeycutt, two brothers, Tony and 
 
 103. King & Spalding, supra note 12. 
 104. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (discussing the equal affect that Kokesh will have 
upon administrative actions). 
 105. See Peter. J Henning, Supreme Court Casts Doubt on a Potent S.E.C. Weapon, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/dealbook/supreme-
court-casts-doubts-on-a-potent-sec-weapon.html (stating that permitting disgorgement in 
administrative courts and not in federal district courts would result in an “odd situation”). 
 106. King & Spalding, supra note 12. 
 107. See TREAZURE R. JOHNSON ET AL., DENTONS, CLIENT ALERT: SUPREME COURT 
SHARPLY LIMITS SEC’S ABILITY TO ORDER DISGORGEMENT, RULING THAT FIVE-YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES (June 7, 2017), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/
alerts/2017/june/7/supreme-court-sharply-limits-sec-ability-to-order-disgorgement (stating 
that “Korkesh [sic] is only the most recent case to suggest that courts will no longer rubber 
stamp the discretion of enforcement authorities.”); see also Jessica S. Mussallem et al., 
Supreme Court Curbs SEC’s Disgorgement Power: Holds That the SEC Can’t Escape the 
SOL, Am. Bar Ass’n (July 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2017/07/
keeping_current.html (“Nelson v. Colorado and Honeycutt v. United States, which limited 
state and federal forfeiture . . . show[] a skepticism for such powerful – and often less 
regulated – government penalties.”). 
 108. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1626, 1628 (2017). 
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Terry Honeycutt, were indicted for federal drug crimes related to the 
distribution of methamphetamine.109  The government sought forfeiture 
in the amount of $269,751.98 of “property constituting, or derived from, 
any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of 
certain drug crimes.”110  Tony, who owned the store from which the 
products were sold, pled guilty and agreed to forfeit $200,000.111  Terry 
was convicted at trial.112  Although Terry never maintained a controlling 
interest in the store and did not directly benefit from the illegal dealings, 
the government asked the court to hold him jointly and severally liable 
for the profits from the illegal sales, seeking to impose a monetary 
judgment against him for the remaining $69,751.98.113  The Supreme 
Court concluded that joint and several liability, “a creature of tort law,” 
could not be used to enforce a criminal forfeiture statute.114  In its analysis 
of the forfeiture statute, the court stated that the provision applied only to 
property “obtained . . . as a result of” the criminal act.115  Because the 
definition of the verb “obtain” clearly refers to property brought into 
one’s own possession, rather than property acquired by another, the 
defendant could not be held jointly and severally liable for property he 
never possessed.116 
The decisions in Kokesh and Honeycutt, in tandem, may signal 
change for the future of disgorgement.117  According to some, a strong 
argument exists for applying the holding in Honeycutt to SEC civil 
enforcement actions seeking disgorgement.118  As the SEC conceded in 
Kokesh, “[t]he equitable remedy of disgorgement . . . simply prevents 
unjust enrichment by forcing the defendant to give up funds he acquired 
unlawfully, thereby placing him in the same position that he would have 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1); Honeycutt, 137 S.Ct. at 1628. 
 111. Honeycutt, 137 S.Ct. at 1628. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1631. 
 115. Id. at 1632. 
 116. Id. at 1635. 
 117. See Maranda Fritz et al., Demise of Disgorgement? Kokesh and Honeycutt In 
Tandem, LAW360 (July 3, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/939021/demise-of-
disgorgement-kokesh-and-honeycutt-in-tandem (discussing the effects of Honeycutt and 
Kokesh “in tandem,” and the limiting effect they have upon the government’s pursuit of 
monetary awards). 
 118. See id. (stating that there may be a strong case for applying “Honeycutt’s rationale” 
concerning joint and several liability to SEC civil enforcement actions). 
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occupied but for the securities-law violation.”119  Other pivotal 
disgorgement cases of the past also indicate that the purpose of 
disgorgement is to compel the defendant to “give up the amount by which 
he was unjustly enriched.” 120  Applying the Honeycutt rationale, 
defendants may challenge the scope of disgorgement, arguing that the 
penalty must be limited to the funds actually acquired by the defendant 
as a result of his or her illegal acts.121  Proponents of this theory face an 
uphill battle, as case law has been overwhelmingly permissive in 
allowing the government to pursue disgorgement awards against parties 
who did not personally possess the ill-gotten gains.122  However, the 
ruling in Honeycutt sets a valid foundation for future challenges to the 
practice of disgorgement.123 
Statements made by the Court during Kokesh also indicate 
concerns with the current scope of the remedy.124  During oral arguments, 
Justice Kagan stated that she found it “unusual that the SEC has not given 
some guidance to its enforcement department [and] that everything is just 
sort of up to the particular person at the SEC who decides to bring such a 
 
 119. Brief for Respondent at 10, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635 (Mar. 27, 2017) (No. 16-
529). 
 120. See Fritz et al., supra note 117 (stating that a number of cases, dating back to Texas 
Gulf Sulphur delineate the scope of disgorgement as “the amount by which a defendant 
profited”); S.E.C. v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 299, 310 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Disgorgement is an 
equitable remedy, imposed to forc[e] a defendant to give up the amount by which he was 
unjustly enriched.”); see, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1336 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The court’s 
power to order disgorgement extends only to the amount with interest by which the defendant 
profited from his wrongdoing.”). 
 121. Bill Maguire et al., Understanding the Full Impact of ‘Kokesh’ on SEC Enforcement 
Proceedings, 258 N.Y. L.J. 1, 3 (Nov. 2, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/hhr-web/files/
Understanding-the-Full-Impact-of-Kokesh.pdf. 
 122. In the past, the SEC has successfully held defendants liable for funds obtained by 
third parties, despite the fact that the defendant never possessed the illicit gains nor acted 
jointly with the third party.  This was especially clear in Contorinis, where the Second Circuit 
ruled that a portfolio manager, whose insider trading led to $7.2 million in profit for the fund 
he managed, could be ordered to pay the full amount based on the reasoning that “a tipper 
could be required to disgorge profits made by others on the basis of the tip.”  See Jay Musoff 
et al., Blurred Lines: Disgorgement, Forfeiture, and Punishment, AM. BAR ASS’N (April 2, 
2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/criminal/articles/spring2014-0414-
blurred-lines-disgorgement-forfeiture-punishment.html (citing Contorinis, 743 F.3d at 310). 
 123. See Fritz et al., supra note 117 (“These decisions, read together, strongly suggest that 
disgorgement can only be imposed based on — and cannot exceed — profits that were 
actually obtained or acquired by the defendant and must not leave the defendant ‘worse off.’”). 
 124. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 
16-529) (indicating Justice Kagan’s concerns with the lack of guidance given to SEC 
investigators pursuing the remedy). 
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case.”125  The Justices noted that disgorgement actions were particularly 
“ripe for abuse” due to the expansive discretion awarded to the SEC in 
pursuing these claims and the relative inconsistencies in the past in 
determining whether disgorgement actions were punitive or nonpunitive 
in nature.126  These sentiments are echoed by others who believe that the 
SEC has been misusing the remedy for years, ignoring the “well-
established meaning” of disgorgement in order to pursue awards which 
go far beyond the actual benefits obtained by the defendant.127 
The standard for calculating disgorgement has historically been 
relatively relaxed compared to that of civil monetary penalties.128  This is 
due to the difficulty the SEC often encounters in determining which 
profits are derived from illegal activity.129  Federal courts have broad 
discretion in their consideration of the amount to be disgorged and need 
only find a “reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to 
the violation.”130  Once established by the government, the defendant 
faces the difficult task of showing that the amount calculated is not a 
“reasonable approximation” of the funds derived from the illegal 
activity.131 
 
 125. Id. at 30. 
 126. See DAN MCCAUGHEY ET AL., ROPES & GRAY LLP, CLIENT ALERT: JUSTICES 
SKEPTICAL OF SEC DISGORGEMENT WITHOUT TIME LIMITS (Apr. 20, 2017) (“Chief Justice 
Roberts noted that the government has argued disgorgement is punitive when it has been 
advantageous to do so (in the area of tax and bankruptcy) but nonpunitive when it is not 
(securities enforcement).”). 
 127. Andrew J. Morris, “Kokesh v. SEC”: Its Wide-Ranging (and Mostly Good) 
Implications for Disgorgement Actions, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (June 14, 2017), https://
wlflegalpulse.com/2017/06/14/kokesh-v-sec-its-wide-ranging-and-mostly-good-
implications-for-disgorgement-actions/. 
 128. See Rita D. Mitchell, Fines, Disgorgement, Injunctions, Debarment: The US 
Perspective, GIR (Jan. 4, 2017), http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/insight/the-
practitioner’s-guide-to-global-investigations/1079348/fines-disgorgement-injunctions-
debarment-the-us-perspective (discussing the methodology of the SEC for calculating civil 
monetary penalties and disgorgement). 
 129. See id. (“Given the challenges in distinguishing between legally and illegally derived 
profits . . . .”). 
 130. See SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that disgorgement 
must represent a “reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation 
. . . .”); see also SEC v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(“[D]isgorgement need only be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to 
the violation.”). 
 131. See Sasha Kalb & Marc Alain Bohn, An Examination of the SEC’s Application of 
Disgorgement in FCPA Resolutions, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (April 12, 2010), 
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/disgorgement-fcpa-how-applied-calculated/ 
(indicating that burden shifts to the defendant to prove, often with some difficulty, that the 
amount presented by the government is not a “reasonable approximation” of the illicit funds). 
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Given the concerns of the Court and the ruling in Kokesh, the SEC 
will likely be forced to revisit the way that it calculates the remedy.132  
With disgorgement now labeled a penalty, arguments may arise as to 
whether this form of relief should be subject to federal securities laws and 
calculated with the same framework used to determine civil monetary 
penalties.133  Redefining the scope of the remedy in this manner and 
applying a set of concrete standards for calculating disgorgement would 
seem to ease the concerns of those Justices who expressed discomfort 
with the level of discretion the SEC currently enjoys in determining these 
awards.134 
B. Challenging Disgorgement 
While the implications of Kokesh are far-reaching concerning 
SEC investigations, they also sound a warning for the future of 
disgorgement.135  During oral arguments, four different justices expressed 
discomfort with the lack of explicit authority permitting the SEC to seek 
disgorgement as a remedy in the federal court system.136  Justice Roberts 
specifically commented that a “reason we have this problem is that the 
SEC devised this remedy or relied on this remedy without any support 
from Congress.  If Congress had provided, here’s a disgorgement remedy, 
you would expect them, as they typically do, to say, here’s a statute of 
 
 132. PAUL V. GERLACH ET AL., SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, SEC’S DISGORGEMENT POWER 
LIMITED 4 (2017), https://www.sidley.com/-/media/update-pdfs/2017/07/anti-corruption-
quarterly-2017-q2.pdf (stating that “Kokesh raises a number of question regarding how 
disgorgement should be calculated . . . .”); LUCINDA A. LOW ET AL., STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP,  
IN THE WAKE OF KOKESH V. SEC: WHITHER DISGORGEMENT IN FCPA CASES (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.steptoe.com/publications-12058.html (stating that Kokesh opens up conversation 
as to how the SEC should be calculating disgorgement). 
 133. GERLACH ET AL., supra note 132, at 4 (stating that there may be a convincing 
argument that disgorgement should be calculated using the statutory framework to determine 
other civil monetary penalties). 
 134. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 13, 15–16, 31–33, 52, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. 
Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529) (indicating that Justice Kagan’s concerns with the remedy of 
disgorgement derives from the lack of guidance currently provided by the SEC to its 
enforcement department as well as the broad discretion awarded to individual’s responsible 
for pursuing these claims). 
 135. King & Spalding, supra note 12 (stating that there may be challenges in the future as 
to whether disgorgement is available as a remedy for the SEC). 
 136. See Morris, supra note 127 (“Kokesh raises . . . the threshold question of whether the 
SEC has the authority to obtain any disgorgement at all. SEC disgorgement is a creation of 
the courts, not Congress.”); see also King & Spalding, supra note 12 (explaining that several 
Justices expressed made comments during oral arguments concerning the lack of statutory 
authority to seek disgorgement). 
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limitations that goes with it.”137  The fact that disgorgement was a 
“creation of the courts, not Congress” is especially troubling, as the SEC 
is “purely a creature of statute,” empowered to act only to the extent 
authorized by Congress.138 
Others challenge disgorgement based on the absence of explicit 
statutory authority, arguing that disgorgement is impermissible as an 
implied right of action.139  For many years, the courts broadened the scope 
of liability through the creation of implied private rights of action.140  
However, recent decisions indicate a trend towards conservatism in the 
court regarding this particular area of law.141  Notably, the late Justice 
Powell stood vehemently against the judicial creation of implied rights, 
stating that “[w]hen this happens, the legislative process with its public 
scrutiny and participation has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice to 
everyone concerned.”142  The Supreme Court remains persuaded by 
Justice Powell’s argument, as it has been generally unwilling to “expand 
previously-recognized implied rights of action or to recognize ‘new’ 
implied private rights of action.”143  With potential challenges to come, it 
is likely that defendants will use this rationale as a basis for attacking the 
validity of disgorgement.144  
 
 137. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-
529). 
 138. Ryan, supra note 8. 
 139. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future of the 
Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases 12 (UCLA Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 17-12, 2017), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992719 [hereinafter Kokesh Footnote 3] (noting that 
decisions involving implied rights of action no longer have the “vitality” that they had in 
earlier years). 
 140. See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 91 (1970) (affirming prior 
decisions and finding that there was an implied right of private action under the Exchange 
Act); see, e.g., Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding 
an implied private right of action for material misrepresentations in the inducement of 
securities sales); see Kokesh Footnote 3, supra note 139. 
 141. See Carmen Germaine, SEC Dealt Major Blow With Justices’ Disgorgement 
Decision, LAW360 (June 5, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/931437/sec-dealt-major-
blow-with-justices-disgorgement-decision (indicating that a requirement of statutory 
authority would reflect the “increasing conservative approach of the court . . . .”). 
 142. See Kokesh Footnote 3, supra note 139, at 12–13 (quoting Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 143. See Kokesh Footnote 3, supra note 139, at 13 (quoting Ciliv v. UXB Int’l, Inc., 2012 
WL 5245323, at *4 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2012)). 
 144. See Kokesh Footnote 3, supra note 139, at 13 (“By undermining the precedents upon 
which Texas Gulf Sulphur relied, this line of Supreme Court cases thus necessarily also calls 
the continuing validity of disgorgement into question.”). 
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What may be the most compelling argument for challenging 
disgorgement lies not in the general text of the Kokesh opinion, but in a 
seemingly innocuous footnote.145  The Kokesh footnote states: 
  
Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an 
opinion on whether courts possess authority to order 
disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or on 
whether courts have properly applied disgorgement 
principles in this context.  The sole question presented in 
this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC 
enforcement actions, is subject to the Statute of 
Limitations. 146 
 
While the language of the text may seem mild, many believe that 
the footnote indicates an interest by the Justices to review the scope of 
the SEC’s authority and the court’s power to award disgorgement.147  
Combined with the Justices’ comments during oral arguments, this 
footnote likely signals future challenges to the agency’s use of 
disgorgement in enforcement actions.148  
As for the outcome in a case challenging SEC authority regarding 
disgorgement, many feel as though there is clear footing to uproot the 
contentious practice.149  By zoning in on the Justices’ concern over lack 
of statutory authority, defendants may successfully remove this powerful 
 
 145. Morris, supra note 127 (“This footnote all but invites defendants to make a 
challenge”); King & Spalding, supra note 12 (stating that the footnote may leave 
disgorgement open to challenge as to whether the remedy is available at all in civil 
enforcement actions). 
 146. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1642 n.3 (2017). 
 147. See Kokesh Footnote 3, supra note 139, at 4 (stating that the footnote is an “apparent 
nod” to concerns of the Justices’ expressed during oral arguments regarding the SEC’s 
authority to obtain disgorgement); King & Spalding, supra note 12 (indicating that the 
footnote may be an invitation by the Supreme Court to challenge disgorgement). 
 148. See Sean Casey et al., Footnote In Kokesh Signals Bigger Changes On The Horizon, 
LAW360 (June 19, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/935752/footnote-in-kokesh-
signals-bigger-changes-on-the-horizon (stating that the footnote in Kokesh may “present an 
opportunity to an aggressive litigant bold enough to challenge the SEC’s long-established 
disgorgement authority”). 
 149. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (indicating that at least two amicus briefs stated 
that the SEC has no authority to seek disgorgement since it is now considered an equitable 
remedy). 
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tool from SEC enforcement actions in federal court.150  However, while 
this result is possible, many individuals think it more likely that courts 
will explore options to preserve disgorgement, limiting its punitive nature 
and redefining the scope of the remedy.151 
C. Changing Law 
A potential product of the concerns related to statutory authority 
in Kokesh is the creation of new law defining the SEC’s authority to 
pursue disgorgement payments in enforcement actions.152  Following 
challenges to the SEC’s authority to pursue disgorgement, the agency 
may seek express authorization from Congress to pursue the remedy in 
federal court, as it has given in the past for administrative proceedings.153  
While a legislative fix such as this would not free disgorgement from the 
Statute of Limitations, it would put to rest concerns over whether the SEC 
has the authority to pursue this remedy in federal court at all.154  
V. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Kokesh is likely to have a significant and ongoing 
impact upon SEC’s enforcement claims.155  In the short-term, the case 
will likely affect the strategies used by the government in investigating 
claims and negotiating settlement agreements in both federal and 
 
 150. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 66 (stating that while Congress has authorized the 
SEC to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings, it has not explicitly authorized the 
SEC to pursue disgorgement in federal court). 
 151. Daniel R. Walfish, Other People’s Money: SEC Disgorgement After ‘Kokesh’, N.Y. 
L. J. (September 8, 2017), https://www.milbank.com/images/content/9/1/v3/91867/NYLJ-
SEC-Disgorgement-After-Kokesh-Sept-2017.pdf (stating that courts will likely “revisit the 
proper scope of the remedy” rather than dismiss disgorgement). 
 152. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (stating that the SEC might “seek a legislative 
fix from Congress” to seek disgorgement). 
 153. Fritz et al., supra note 115 (stating that Kokesh may result in a substantial rewriting 
of the law to grant the SEC express authority to pursue disgorgement as Congress provided it 
for administrative proceedings in the 1990 Remedies Act); FETAZ ET AL., supra note 51 
(stating that the SEC may seek to change the law to grant it statutory authority to seek 
disgorgement in district court). 
 154. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 
16-529) (indicating concerns with the lack of statutory authority enabling the SEC to pursue 
disgorgement actions in federal court). 
 155. See King & Spalding, supra note 12 (discussing the effects upon current SEC 
strategies as well as the future of the remedy at law). 
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administrative proceedings.156  Law firms and SEC-regulated institutions 
may also see an upswing in the number of criminal referrals to the DOJ 
and in the SEC’s pursuit of other equitable remedies explicitly authorized 
by law.157   
Kokesh also poses long-term ramifications for the future of the 
remedy in SEC enforcement actions in federal court.158  Based upon the 
comments made during oral arguments as well as the language of the 
footnote in Kokesh, defendants will find a basis for challenging the SEC’s 
authority regarding disgorgement.159  While it remains unclear whether 
this will result in a removal of disgorgement from the agency’s 
enforcement toolbox, many believe that there is a strong argument for 
doing so.160  In order to circumvent any issues regarding the lack of 
explicit authority to seek disgorgement, the SEC may seek a “legislative 
fix,” calling for Congress to rewrite securities law to explicitly name 
disgorgement as a remedy the SEC has the power to pursue in federal 
court.161  
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